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The International Banking and Finance Institute (IBFI) organised its fifth international monetary
seminar from 12 to 16 May 2003 on the topic “Vulnerabilities and surveillance of the international
financial system”. This seminar brought together 43 participants from the central banks of industrialised
and emerging countries as well as from international institutions (BIS, IMF, OECD, FSF, etc.), and
around 30 speakers from various central banks, international bodies and the private sector.
The first two days were devoted to:
– providing an overview of developments in the international environment, markets and the financial
system including the insurance sector, which gave rise to a speech by a director at the French
Insurance Association;
– analysing the vulnerabilities of the banking and financial system, in particular those stemming
from changes in market techniques and market participants’ behaviour;
– analysing accounting and prudential issues arising from the implementation of the future
international solvency ratio and the introduction of the new international financial reporting
standards;
– examining current ideas on resolving international financial crises, with particular focus on the
approach proposed by the Banque de France with a view to fostering a “Code of conduct” for the
voluntary renegotiation between sovereign issuers and creditors, as well as the IMF’s point of view
on the restructuring of sovereign debt, put forward by Anne Krueger, deputy managing director of
the IMF, in a video-conference transmitted live from Washington 1.
In the two days that followed, there ensued lively debate between the participants, who formed
two workshops: one on the interactions between financial markets and monetary policy, and the other
on the provisions of the New Basel Accord and the financial reporting standards and their impact on
economic cycles 2.
1 A full version of Anne Krueger’s speech follows on from this summary.
2 A summary of the workshops can be found on the Banque de France’s website: www.banque-france.fr/gb/banque/ibfi.Vulnerabilities and surveillance of the international financial system
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The first workshop was mainly organised around three topics:
– central bank communication, in the areas of monetary policy, foreign exchange and financial stability;
– methods of identifying vulnerabilities in financial systems;
– links between price stability and financial stability.
The second workshop focused on three issues:
– the new financial reporting standards put forward by the International Accounting Standard
Board and their implications for credit institutions, in particular with respect to the principle
of prudence and the need to avoid introducing artificial volatility into accounts;
– the future solvency ratio applicable to credit institutions as defined in the New Basel
Capital Accord;
– the convergence or divergence between financial reporting and prudential standards.
Although focusing on seemingly different issues, the rich and fruitful discussions that were held
throughout the workshops revealed a broad community of views on financial stability issues underlying
the two topics examined.
Moreover, a dinner-discussion was organised by Pr Avinash Persaud, holder of the Chair in Commerce
at Gresham College, on the risks of financial instability arising from the standardisation of asset
allocation approaches, herd behaviours and the blind use of portfolio risk management techniques.
Discussions ended with a round table debate, introduced by Governor Trichet and chaired
by Mr Marc-Olivier Strauss-Kahn, Director General – Directorate General Economics and
International Relations. Five speakers discussed the topic of “transparency and market discipline”:
– Mr Flemming Larsen, Director of the IMF’s European Offices;
– Mr William Witherell, Director of Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD;
– Mr Michel Prada, former chairman of the COB and of the International Organisation
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 3;
– Mr Jan Brockmeijer, Deputy Executive Director for Supervision, Nederlandsche Bank;
– and Mr Svein Andresen, Secretary General of the FSF, who summed up the discussions.
Mr Flemming Larsen discussed the issue of transparency in emerging economies in the light of the
international financial crises that marked the past decade. In this respect, he stressed the benefits
attached to the adoption and the effective implementation by these economies of the international
3 Michel Prada was appointed Chairman of the Capital Markets Authority (Autorité des marchés financiers) in November 2003.Vulnerabilities and surveillance of the international financial system
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codes and standards promoted by the IMF and the World Bank. These codes and standards cover
twelve key areas that would benefit from the application of the principles and standards developed by
international bodies in the area of economic governance and financial regulation, and transparency
and corporate governance. The IMF reports on the implementation of these codes and standards
provide a good means to enhance transparency, market discipline and multilateral surveillance, while
helping national authorities to identify priority actions for improving the resilience of their economy.
Mr William Witherell discussed the role of corporate governance rules and financial transparency as
a means to guaranteeing the integrity and smooth functioning of financial markets. The challenge that
now lies ahead for regulators and government authorities is to develop a legal and regulatory framework
that fully integrates these requirements in order to rebuild investor confidence and to ensure the effective
use of market discipline. As regards the scope of these requirements, he recalled the set of general
principles defined in this context by the OECD. These principles are now embodied in the international
standards, whose application is recommended by the FSF for industrialised and emerging economies
alike. He also stressed the great importance of the rules of governance and internal control in financial
institutions given their role in allocating resources, their responsibilities to investors, and their particular
exposure to the risks of conflicts of interest owing to the nature of their activities.
Mr Michel Prada 4 first recalled the main areas in which regulators were currently working to restore
market foundations and improve the functioning of the market: introducing international financial
reporting  standards, implementing corporate governance principles, organising and supervising
auditors, and lastly defining professional standards for the players in charge of interpreting financial
information and transmitting it to investors, analysts and rating agencies. He then discussed the
challenges arising from the globalisation and increasingly broad scope of markets, underscoring the
implications of the risk transfer techniques currently used by intermediaries and the factors underlying
the recent excess volatility of asset prices. These developments call for, above and beyond the close
co-ordination between the prudential regulation of intermediaries and market regulation, the stepping
up of international cooperation between regulators and a better understanding of market mechanisms
in order to counter factors of financial instability.
Lastly, Mr Jan Brockmeijer discussed Pillar III (market discipline) in the framework of the new capital
adequacy regime for banks defined by the Basel Committee. Going hand in hand with the other
two Pillars of the New Basel Capital Accord, Pillar III provides for a number of disclosure requirements
that enable market participants and prudential authorities to obtain all the necessary parameters to
assess risk profiles and the creditworthiness of credit institutions.
4 A full version of Mr Prada’s speech follows on from this summary.Vulnerabilities and surveillance of the international financial system
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The past year has witnessed a vigorous and
constructive debate regarding the need to improve
arrangements for the resolving of financial crises,
and in particular the tools for restructuring sovereign
debt. To be sure, this remains a controversial topic.
But the debate has served to help define the issues,
and to build understanding on possible ways to
strengthen the international financial system. In
particular, how to address the hopefully rare cases in
which sovereign debtors and creditors must confront
debt burdens that have become unsustainable. At
times, however, the intensity of the discourse may
have tended to mask the extent to which there has
indeed been a convergence of views regarding the
nature of the problem, and the desirability of taking
actions to strengthen the system.
Today I would like to step back from the fray and
look at the convergence of views on the diagnosis
of the problem, and at some of the factors that will
have to be part of the solution.
1|1 Importance of policies
as crisis prevention tools
A first point on which there is general agreement
concerns the importance of the sustained
implementation of sound macroeconomic policies.
And the critical importance of buttressing these with
efforts to reduce vulnerabilities to crises. Strengthening
tools for resolving crises and the debate about how to
improve mechanisms for sovereign debt restructurings
must never be allowed to detract from the critical need
to persevere with reforms that could reduce the
frequency, and mitigate the severity, of crises.
In this regard, substantial progress has been made in
recent years. In many respects, the world economy
is now more resilient to shocks. Moves toward more
flexible exchange rate regimes, strengthening of
domestic financial systems (particularly through
enhanced banking supervision), and rebuilding
official reserves have contributed to making
economies more robust and less vulnerable to crises.
We should not forget that the crises in Asia, Russia,
and Brazil of the late 1990s were typically associated
with pegged exchange rates, a mix of monetary and
fiscal policies that attracted short-term capital hoping
to benefit from high domestic interest rates, and
generally inadequate banking supervision. But we
should not lose sight of the fact that there are a
number of emerging market countries that have high
debt burdens and continue to experience fiscal
pressures.
Of course, through bilateral and multilateral
surveillance, we are engaged in a continuous
dialogue with our members, which focuses on the
implementation of sound policies. But in recent
years, the Fund has put enormous emphasis on
prevention. Beyond working on strengthening
macroeconomic policy frameworks, we have worked
closely with our members to help them assess and
manage vulnerabilities, strengthen surveillance over
financial systems, and improve debt management.
We have stressed the importance of remaining
vigilant to developments in capital markets,
re-orienting and re-designing policies where needed.
For instance, it is important that financial
supervision be kept in line with increased
integration into global capital markets. Moreover,
with the aim of improving the environment for
private sector decision taking, we have promoted
transparency, and have disseminated – and
encouraged adherence to – standards and codes.
Of course, we must avoid complacency, and
recognize that despite best efforts at prevention,
crises will still occur. The 15 or so years since the
resolution of the 1980s debt crisis have witnessed
large-scale capital flows to emerging market
borrowers. But we are now moving into a period in
which an increasing number of emerging markets
have become mature borrowers – by which I mean
countries that regained access to capital markets
have allowed their debts to increase to levels at
which future net borrowing needs be kept strictly
in line with their growth in their payments capacity.
This has a number of implications:
– first, although we have recently seen some
resurgence in capital market activity, in the
period ahead we should not expect net debt
creating flows to emerging markets to return to
the scale of those witnessed in the 1990s. Indeed,
the recent trends in net flows to emerging market
sovereigns may be comforting to the extent that
1| The IMF’s view on the restructuring of sovereign debt
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it may indicate that debt markets are not
repeating the bubble behavior experienced in
other asset markets;
– second, with only limited capacity to take on
additional debt in the context of resolving crises,
countries’ room for maneuver to address building
tensions may be more restricted than was the
case in the past;
– third, close attention to developments in
countries’ vulnerabilities, and prompt corrective
action, is more important than ever.
1|2 Resolution of financial crises
However, in a hopefully very limited number of
cases, countries may experience rising debt or other
capital account pressures – including unanticipated
external shocks – which may develop into full-blown
crises:
– in some cases, the source of the difficulties may
lie in the balance sheet of the public sector. As a
result of some combination of bad policies and
bad luck, a sovereign may experience acute
liquidity difficulties, and in extreme cases may
find that its debt burden has become
unsustainable;
– we are also likely to continue to witness cases
where the source of the problem may lie in
financial (or nonfinancial) corporate sectors.
Recent crises have demonstrated the ways in
which difficulties in one set of balance sheets in
an economy can rapidly propagate across to other
sectors, and spillover to the external accounts1.
This suggests that the resolution of individual crises
will need to be tailored to the diversity of situations
that our members may confront.
In any event, there is typically at least a brief period
between the recognition that a member has a
building capital account or an acute debt problem
and the outset of a full-blown crisis. But in such
circumstances, time is the friend of neither country
authorities nor private investors. Nevertheless, there
is likely to be a window of opportunity for taking
corrective actions that offer the prospect of resolving
crises in a fashion that limits the scale of economic
dislocation and preserves assets’ economic value.
The challenge confronting policy makers is to utilize
the window, and thereby to avert an even worse
outcome.
– In some cases, a combination of the forceful
implementation of corrective policies, market
based liability management operations, and
official financing may allow for a rapid and
orderly resolution of the crisis.
– In other cases, it may be necessary to
complement the sustained implementation of
corrective policies and the provision of official
financing, with concerted measures to reprofile
– or in some cases even reduce – debt service
burdens. Here too the design of the measures
to resolve a crisis will need to be carefully
formulated to reflect the member’s situation.
In some cases, it may be necessary to
restructure the debt of the sovereign. But if
sovereign debt restructuring is the hammer in
the international community’s toolbox, we must
recognize that not every crisis is a nail! Other
cases may need to address some combination
of the liabilities of nonsovereign debtors and
capital flight.
1|3 The Fund’s access policy
The Fund, through its role both as an advisor and
as a lender, will continue to play a key role in the
resolution of financial crises. And so access policy
– the conditions under which the Fund is willing to
extend support for a member’s adjustment program,
and the scale of such support – will remain an important
parameter in the resolution of crises. The scale of
potential financing needs has increased as a result of
the increasing integration of countries into the global
economy, and with it the risk of abrupt changes in
market sentiment and reversal of capital flows.
In some cases, it may be appropriate for the Fund
to provide large-scale access in support of a forceful
adjustment program. This would be done with the
expectation that, as policies take hold and confidence
builds, this support will have a catalytic effect in
facilitating a return to national and international
capital markets. But it would only be appropriate
for consideration to be given to large-scale access to
the Fund’s resources in cases where:
1 See, for example, “A Balance Sheet Approach to Financial Crisis” (2002) by Mark Allen, Christoph Rosenberg, Christian Keller, Brad Setser and
Nouriel Roubini, WP/02/210 (www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02210.pdf).Vulnerabilities and surveillance of the international financial system
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– the member country is experiencing exceptional
balance of payments pressures on the capital
account, resulting in a need for Fund financing
that cannot be met within the normal limits;
– a rigorous and systematic analysis indicates that
there is a high probability that debt will remain
sustainable;
– the member has good prospects of regaining
access to private capital markets within the time
Fund resources would be outstanding, so that the
Fund’s financing would provide a bridge;
– the policy program of the member country
provides a reasonably strong prospect of success,
including not only the member’s adjustment
plans, but also its institutional and political
capacity to deliver that adjustment.
In other cases, however, these conditions may not
be satisfied, and so it would not be appropriate for
the Fund to provide exceptional access to its
resources. Accordingly, in such cases the resolution
of crises must entail some form of concerted
refinancing or restructuring of the claims on
sovereign and/or nonsovereign debtors.
1|4 Strengthening
the arrangements for resolving
sovereign debt difficulties
Now let me turn to efforts to strengthen
arrangements for resolving sovereign debt
difficulties. The debate surrounding the Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) served as
a useful platform to consider avenues for improving
the debt restructuring process. While we do not now
have the high level of support that would be
required to make the adoption of the proposed
mechanism feasible, the analytic work and broad
discussion has been extremely helpful in helping
to develop our thinking on where the main
shortcomings lie.
The focus of our current efforts is on promoting
the inclusion of collective action clauses (CACs)
in debt contracts, and, more generally, on finding
ways to improve arrangements for sovereign
debt restructuring within the existing legal
framework.
1|5 Process of debt restructuring
Let me first address ways in which the process of
debt restructuring could be improved. A number of
commentators have highlighted, in particular, the
absence of procedural clarity regarding the conduct
of debtors and creditors.
These concerns have contributed to calls for a
voluntary Code of good conduct. The various proposals
that have emerged – including, importantly, from the
Banque de France – are constructive, and could, in
our view, help provide greater predictability to the
restructuring process under any legal framework:
– a Code could be made applicable to a broad set
of circumstances, ranging from periods of relative
tranquility to periods of acute stress, and could
constitute an established set of best practices.
In contrast, proposals for strengthening
arrangements for debt restructuring have a more
limited scope and purpose – to facilitate the
resolution of financial crises;
– by its very nature, a voluntary Code, while
potentially helpful, could not resolve collective
action problems. This is a subject to which I shall
return in a moment;
– finally, a Code could only be effective to the extent
to which it is able to attract broad support among
debtors and their creditors. Accordingly, the most
promising approach to developing a code that
could form the basis of a consensus would be for
it to be developed jointly by debtors, their
creditors, and other interested parties (including
the Fund). Conversely, it appears unlikely that a
Code designed by the Fund would attract broad
support, though we stand ready to collaborate with
others in the elaboration of a code.
Recent adaptations in Fund policies could be
complementary to a Code. Last year the Fund’s
Executive Board adopted a modification of the lending
into arrears policy – the policies that govern the
circumstances under which the Fund can provide
financial support for a member’s adjustment program
during the period in which it has arrears to private
creditors, and is attempting to reach agreement on a
restructuring. This policy establishes expectations
regarding the behavior of debtors that are receiving
financial support from the Fund in such circumstances:Vulnerabilities and surveillance of the international financial system
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The debtor should engage in an early dialogue,
which should continue until the restructuring is
completed:
– the debtor should share relevant, non-confidential
information with all creditors on a timely basis.
This would include an explanation of the
adjustment program and the financial
circumstances that justify a restructuring, as well
as a comprehensive picture of all domestic and
external claims on the sovereign;
– the debtor should provide creditors with an early
opportunity to give input on the design of the
restructuring strategy. This could help address
the specific needs of different types of investors,
thereby increasing the likelihood of a high
participation rate.
In addition, in cases in which creditors have
organized a reasonably representative committee on
a timely basis, there is an expectation that the
member would negotiate with such a committee.
Our policy suggests a number of principles that
should guide the debtor’s conduct during
negotiations. In formulating these principles, we
have drawn on the expertise of workout specialists
reflected, for example, in the report by the Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR), and efforts by
International Federation of Insolvency Professionals
(INSOL) to distill best practice for nonsovereign
workouts.
1|6 Collective action difficulties
Let me add a few words concerning the motivation
behind initiatives to promote the inclusion of CACs.
An important shortcoming of the existing
arrangements for the restructuring of sovereign debt
relates to the failure of collective action. It
complicates the process of reaching agreement on
a restructuring. There is a danger that individual
creditors will decline to participate in a voluntary
restructuring in the hope of recovering payment on
the original contractual terms, even though creditors
– as a group – would be best served by agreeing to a
restructuring:
– the problem of collective action is most acute
prior to a default, where individual creditors may
have some reasonable hope of continuing to
receive payments under the terms of their
original contracts;
– following a default, the options facing creditors
– particularly those who have no interest in
litigation – are more limited and so the problems
of collective action may be less acute. But a more
formal mechanism would still make sense in
such cases. It would provide greater clarity as to
the predictability and transparency of the process
by which agreement could be reached, while of
course eliminating the possibility of at least some
creditors hoping to secure better terms through
litigation.
But we should not fall into the trap of believing
that default is a good solution to collective action
difficulties. Of course, there is no doubt that
following default, agreement on a restructuring
would eventually be reached. But default – and the
associated uncertainties regarding creditor-debtor
relations – tends to be associated with widespread
economic dislocation. Proposals for strengthening
arrangements for debt restructuring are intended
to increase the likelihood that early agreement can
be reached on restructuring that can restore
viability. They are also intended to see that neither
debtors nor their creditors must bear costs that are
unduly large.
But I am pleased to be able to say that progress is
being made! I would like to take this opportunity to
applaud Mexico, Brazil, and most recently, South
Africa for the inclusion of CACs in their recent bond
issues governed by New York law. These are very
important steps. If this leads to the establishment
of a new market standard, it could go a long way
toward a more orderly and efficient process for debt
restructurings. The Fund’s role in this area is to
promote the voluntary use of CACs through its
surveillance, as recently mandated by the
International Monetary and Financial Committee
(IMFC).
1|7 Dealing with banking
system crises
In addition to the work on improving the sovereign
debt restructuring process, there is also a need to
develop further our thinking on a number of other
issues arising in the context of a crisis. One is how
best to assist members in addressing systemic
banking crises, particularly in cases in which the
system is highly-dollarized, and/or cases in which
systems that are highly exposed to sovereign debt.Vulnerabilities and surveillance of the international financial system
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With highly-dollarized banking systems, issues arise
regarding the extent to which liquidity assistance
can be sustained in the event of a crisis, where that
assistance has to be provided in a currency that the
government does not have the ability to create. The
inability of a central bank to serve as a credible
lender of last resort in these circumstances may end
up fueling a run and leading to greater economic
disruption. In this context, questions may arise as
to the extent to which it would be appropriate for
the official sector to step in with additional financing
to boost the central bank’s lender of last resort
capacity, which in turn raises several issues
regarding debt sustainability and the adequacy of
macro policies.
As the recent cases of Argentina and Uruguay
illustrate, the combination of a highly-dollarized
banking system and a rigid exchange rate regime
can result in vulnerabilities are difficult to manage.
In this context, severe liquidity losses stemming
from a bank run will quickly feed into a currency
crisis and eventually necessitate a sharp exchange
rate adjustment. The adjustment in relative prices
may in turn induce an unsustainable debt profile
and severe balance sheet problems in the corporate
sector. These problems will be further compounded
when the banking system is largely exposed to the
sovereign’s unsustainable debt, and as restructuring
will unavoidably amount to a further deterioration
in banks’ balance sheets. Thus, measures to stem
the effects of debt restructuring on the banking
system also need to be considered in greater depth.
1|8 Conclusion
In conclusion, let me summarize the five key areas
where there appears to be broad agreement.
First, there is no doubt about the critical role of
prevention and the importance of sustained
implementation of appropriate macroeconomic and
structural policies. The best way to ensure that
countries gain the benefits of globalization while
avoiding the pitfalls is through constant vigilance
in economic management, including the prudential
supervision of financial systems.
Second, there is a need to improve the existing
arrangements for restructuring sovereign debt. The
intention is not to make sovereign debt restructuring
an easy option. But rather to allow debtors with
unsustainable debt burdens to reach agreement on
a restructuring without unnecessary dislocation and
loss of asset values. Of course, nobody believes that
this is the complete answer to the difficulties of
resolving financial crises. The restructuring of
sovereign debt is likely, as a practical matter, to need
to be complemented by other measures. Including
those to stabilize and restructure the domestic
financial system, and perhaps resolve balance sheet
difficulties in the corporate sector. It may also need
to be conducted against the background of
temporary resort to some combination of exchange
controls and a deposit freeze. But that is a subject
for another day.
Third, a key market failure relates to collective
action. This is the main pillar of both the contractual
and statutory approaches to improving the
arrangements for sovereign debt restructuring.
Welcome progress is being made with the
incorporation of collective action clauses into
sovereign debt contracts. This is encouraging. Now
that the first mover problem has been resolved, we
must redouble our efforts to promote the widespread
adoption of such clauses.
Fourth, there is considerable merit in efforts to
improve the transparency and predictability of the
debt restructuring process. Here I see strong
complementarities between a possible Code of good
conduct, some of the proposals for CACs, the recent
revisions to the Fund’s lending into arrears
policy – which establishes expectations regarding
debtor’s behavior vis-à-vis their creditors – and a
number of key features of the SDRM proposal. But
we have further to go.
Finally, there is a need for further thinking on how
to deal with the implications of a crisis for the
banking system and how to reduce the effects of
debt restructuring on the financial sector when it is
highly exposed to sovereign debt. The experience
of Argentina has served to illustrate how these
elements may combine to generate massive
economic and social disruptions.Vulnerabilities and surveillance of the international financial system
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2| Transparency and market discipline
Michel Prada’s speech
First of all, I would like to thank you for inviting me
to this seminar on issues that I have continued to
take a close interest in since my departure from the
French Stock Exchange Commission. I will certainly
repeat some of the things that have already been
said, but that rather goes with the territory.
I believe that the increasing awareness of the need
for much greater co-ordination of market regulation
on the one hand and prudential regulation on the
other is one that should  be analysed in the light of
recent events.
The Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in
1998 prompted the awareness of the need to forge
closer links between the different systems of
financial regulation by bringing together:
– first, prudential regulation of the financial
intermediaries that bear risk in their balance
sheets: banks, investment firms and insurance
companies;
– second, regulation of the markets themselves,
which has traditionally been aimed at correcting
any asymmetries of information among market
players,  guaranteeing the smooth running of the
markets and protecting savers;
– lastly, the work of these two systems of regulation
should be co-ordinated with the actions of
international organisations, IFIs and the leaders
of the major economies.
This is a fairly recent approach which arises, of
course, from globalisation and, perhaps even more
so, from disintermediation. It takes into account the
recognition that there is a close link between the
macroeconomic approaches that have conventionally
been used for the analysis and management of
financial stability, and microeconomic approaches,
which have perhaps been given less attention in the
past. As a result, it is now deemed necessary to
integrate these two approaches in an infinitely more
co-ordinated manner.
The setting-up of the Financial Stability Forum in
1999 was a reflection of this development. The
Forum’s work has made possible significant progress
in studying problems and finding solutions to them,
whereby, for conceptual and operational reasons,
market foundations are distinguished from the more
technical aspects of prudential regulation.
Furthermore, until very recently, the focus was de facto
on issues relating to emerging markets, since market
disturbances there appeared to be at the root of global
instability and financial vulnerability. This was the
perspective at the end of the 1990s. We can also say
that Japan was a source for concern in this context.
The new situation, with the bursting of the net
economy bubble, the various scandals that have
occurred principally in the United States, and the
slowdown of the world economy – which was
certainly exacerbated by the crisis in international
relations, but which is essentially due to a loss of
confidence in the system and the need to rid it of
excessive debt – has changed the way in which
financial regulation and the relationships between
its various instruments are approached. Thus,
questions are now being raised not only about
emerging markets but also about the markets that
are considered the most highly developed.
The deliberations and activities of the major players
in the field of regulation, as reflected in the
discussions of the G7 and G8, can – somewhat
artificially – be divided into the two central themes
that I alluded to just now:
– first, how can we restore market foundations and
improve the functioning of the market?
– second – and this is more open to debate – should
the conventional instruments of prudential and
macro-financial regulation be complemented by
a more appropriate approach that takes into
account the specific developments in the
financial markets themselves?
There is a fairly broad consensus on the first theme.
To keep it brief, it relates to the issue of information,
which is at the heart of market efficiency and integrity.
The serious malfunctionings observed in recent
years have shown that the information supplied to
the market was too often inaccurate or incomplete,
or even plainly misleading. This had an impact both
on market players’ individual and collective
behaviour and on the manner in which market
regulators intervened.Vulnerabilities and surveillance of the international financial system
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There are three major issues that underlie the
question of market foundations:
– first, the need to use appropriate language to
format and communicate information;
– second, the need to identify, contain and, if
possible, anticipate – if they cannot be eradicated –
the conflicts of interest that distort the behaviour
of major market players, whose role is to
disseminate, verify and interpret information;
– lastly, there is the more general issue of ethics, of
the basic morality of market players, particularly
those that by definition benefit from the asymmetry
of information inherent in a market system.
The role of market regulators ought to be a central
one on all these issues.  This is not the case in all
countries either because regulation has not yet
reached the necessary level of maturity, or because
regulation is still in the hands of professional
interests that have not always managed to deal with
their own conflicts of interest and problems of
self-discipline.
However, substantial progress is being made in
terms of international convergence, notably under
the aegis of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the other
regulatory bodies supported by the Forum.
Today, all we can do is to list the main areas into
which the huge task at hand can be broken down.
The first is the definition of internationally
recognised accounting standards that are suited to
the market economy. This is the role of the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB),
which is charged with designing principles and
standards that correspond to the needs of this type
of economy.
The IOSCO has played a key role in this area by
monitoring the proposals of the former IASC, then
by recognising the core standards of the IASC in
2000, and today this process is well under way
with the support of the European Union, which
has adopted its own standards. As a consequence,
the debate is now focusing, as I see it, more on a
sectoral problem – that of banking and insurance –
than on general critique of the IASB standards.
The second area of work, which was just mentioned
at length, and I won’t dwell on it, concerns the actual
implementation of  principles of corporate governance
to ensure that the management of companies is
subject to appropriate checks, and delivers to
shareholders and markets, in accordance with the
principle of transparency, relevant, consistent and
timely information, which is, of course, accurate and
sincere regarding the company’s strategy, and its
objectives, prospects and results.
The IOSCO and the OECD are in the front line in
this area.
The third area is an effective audit system that
guarantees the quality of financial information and
in particular its compliance with the relevant
standards. This has to do with the way the audit
profession is organised and its oversight and the
IOSCO has finally started to address the question.
The Enron crisis and the other scandals really have
triggered a radical shift in thinking in many
countries, above all in the United States, where
hitherto there was a reluctance to involve regulators
in laying down standards for behaviour in this area.
In October 2002, the ad hoc committee of
chairmen of Securities Commissions that belong
to the IOSCO’s Technical Committee, which was
set up after September 11, adopted a set of
standards designed to prevent conflicts of interest
between auditors and consultants, to promote the
audit committees that were referred to just now
and to establish in each country a supervisory
system for auditors that is external to the audit
profession.
The fourth area is that of professional and ethical
standards that need to be laid down for professions
that interpret information, disseminate assessments
and advise the public.
Here again, the IOSCO was for a long time reluctant
to intervene in this area until circumstances led it
to address the question via two working groups, one
of which deals with analysts and the other with
rating agencies.
That work is under way; so far, not much can be
said about. Regarding rating agencies, I personally
think that the time has come for us to ask these
structures to  organise themselves as a profession.
It is probably the only financial profession that is not
organised either at a domestic or an international level.
I also think that it is time to ask the rating agencies
to define among themselves, make public and, of
course, apply technical standards and standardsVulnerabilities and surveillance of the international financial system
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of governance that are published, as it is the case
for most other professions, so that people have a
better understanding of how they function and to
prevent potential conflicts of interest.
In particular, I am concerned with the question of
whether, in some instances, we might not see the
emergence of a similar phenomenon to that
observed in auditing.
Once these agencies have established profitable
business lines in their main area of activity, it is
obviously very tempting for them to capitalise on
this core business by developing side lines, which,
if they take on a significant dimension, can have a
substantial impact on the company’s main business
line and create conflicts of interest. This is what
has led to the ruin of certain auditing firms.
This completes the overview of these market
foundations. My impression is that there is a great
deal of international consensus on these subjects. Of
course there are different views, different cultural
perspectives, but there is no real disagreement
regarding the need to implement appropriate standards
in a much more proactive way than in the past.
Of course, the question remains regarding the
effective implementation of the relevant standards.
This will require efforts in terms of self-regulation,
the involvement of government bodies in each of
the countries concerned and lastly – perhaps above
all – the technical support and determination of the
major international organisations, which can
provide assistance via the programmes that have
just been referred to.
Our second topic is rather different in terms of its
philosophical perspective and is probably more
controversial.
It concerns the relationship between the
macro-financial functioning of markets and the issue
of financial stability.
As I see it, the problem stems from the fact that the
bulk of prudential regulation is focused on the
soundness of intermediaries, with no direct
intervention in the overall functioning of markets,
in which non-intermediaries such as ordinary,
generally unregulated, issuers and investors do
business with one another. Meanwhile, market
regulators, i.e. securities regulators, focus for their
part on the functioning of the market, rules of
conduct and information, and restrict themselves
to noting developments and trends, but refrain from
commenting on or attempting to steer these
developments.
In a world undergoing a rapid process of
disintermediation and  internationalisation,
combined with incredible technological progress and
financial  innovation, clearly new questions arise.
Against the background of conventional
monetary policy, is the containment of
intermediaries’ vulnerability through ever more
effective risk management sufficient to guarantee
and manage financial stability?
We have been observing the transfer of risk from
the market by intermediaries that used to carry
virtually all of this risk in their balance sheet at a
time when markets did not occupy the same role
and were under the control of the relevant regulator.
Risk transfer is direct when issuers deal directly with
investors via the market, and since the early 1990s
we have seen a tremendous growth in corporate bonds.
Another example of direct risk transfer is when
banks’ trading departments move away from their
traditional framework and no longer work with
banks’ capital but with that of their clients. This issue
is becoming increasingly important in the light of
the development of techniques of alternative fund
management, i.e. products that are marketed for use
by professionals and those with experience in the
field, but which in my country, as in many others,
have begun to be sold directly or indirectly to the
general public.
Lastly, indirect risk transfer occurs when
intermediaries hedge against risks they have taken
with regard to their clients and on the markets
by using derivatives or securitisation, or through
contractual risk transfer. In this scenario, some
of the ultimate risk holders are not subject to
macro-prudential regulation, i.e. pension funds,
mutual funds, reinsurers and individual investors.
We can see, therefore, the kind of chain reaction
that can take place and cause destabilisation and
vulnerability when, at first sight, it appears that the
robustness of the financial system is assured. If
markets become exuberant, asset prices skyrocket,
debt that has been collateralised using these assets
can also skyrocket and nobody is in a position to
contain the trend.
Initially, the risk does not appear directly in the
balance sheets of intermediaries that have proven
solidity. It is only when the markets come downVulnerabilities and surveillance of the international financial system
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from their dizzying heights that people become
aware of what has taken place.  This sparks a crisis,
a crisis of confidence, then a crisis of growth, and
then possibly – let’s hope it won’t happen –
a financial crisis.
Another topic in a similar vein also appears
important to me, which is perhaps even more
controversial than the first: that of the extreme
volatility of asset prices.
Many people regard volatility as part and parcel of the
way the market functions and consider that we should
not by excessive regulation take the risk of producing
perverse effects and increasing market inefficiency.
It needs to be recognised, however, that excessive
volatility itself – the recent period demonstrates
this – gives rise to perverse effects and can actually
reduce the credibility of the market model as such.
At this stage, it is not a question of proposing action
to deal with volatility, but rather of having a better
understanding of the processes involved, and
identifying the potential mechanisms that
exacerbate destabilisation.
As with the externalisation of risk that I talked
about earlier, the first observation  to make is that
there is inadequate information and a lack of
understanding regarding the nature of these
phenomena. It is interesting to note in this
respect that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which for a long time was
reticent regarding regulators’ involvement in
these issues, has just decided to study the
potentially destabilising effects of short selling
combined with securities lending and the
strategies of alternative fund managers.
The British Financial Services Authority (FSA) and
the French Financial Markets Council and Stock
Exchange Commission have also begun to study
these issues, and the Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR) is also looking into
this area.
The Financial Stability Forum has addressed
these matters at its recent meetings, and the Bank
for International Settlements also recently
published some interesting studies, notably on
credit risk transfer which, it notes, largely escapes
statistical analysis.
Preparing the French G7 presidency provided an
opportunity to look at these questions regarding the
relationship between market functioning and
financial stability.
It was in no way, of course, a question of
recommending solutions based on an
interventionist ideology rejected – quite rightly –
by advocates of the market economy.  It was rather
a case of taking note of recent developments,
recognising that we do not have an adequate
information base regarding these matters, and
encouraging the relevant  organisations – IFIs,
regulatory organisations, central banks – to
address these issues.
I believe that it is crucial to give these areas special
attention in order to gain a better understanding of
the sources of these destabilising factors that are
liable to damage the credibility of assumed market
efficiency. An in-depth study of the relationships
between the microeconomic regulation of markets
and the prudential regulation of intermediaries is
also needed.
By way of conclusion, I would like to react to some
of the arguments we are seeing in the press at the
moment, especially in France, I’m afraid to say.
I do not believe that recent events, as serious as
they are, should prompt any sort of back tracking
or calling into question of the major progress that
has been made since the 1980s in terms of building
a global market economy.
In this regard, the sometimes fundamental and
often fearful critique of globalisation and
expansion of markets is not productive. We should,
on the contrary, deepen our understanding of
these developments, reinforce international
co-operation among regulators – in the broadest
sense – and representatives of the financial
industry, design and implement better and more
comprehensive standards, and patiently build a
world-wide system of regulation that is in keeping
with globalised financial markets.